Background:
Recently, we are witnessing a new phenomenon that seems to be skyrocketing: stronger collaborations of terror organizations from both sides of Bab al-Mandab strait/ Gulf of Aden. Furthermore, it includes the “umbrella” terror organizations that are functioning as the patrons/ ideological and religious guidance of those at Bab al-Mandab.
Basically, the sides of this equation are: on one side the Houthis (Yemen) with their Iranian patron, mimicking the IRGC-QF model. On the other side, al-Shabab (Somalia) with their affiliation to al-Qaeda, and practically its collaboration with AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen).
Although there are differences between both sides on the matter of perspectives and aspirations, all the terror organizations mentioned here (including with Islamic State Somalia as well) are opportunistic, learning and adapting entities that understood that if they will collaborate, they can do much greater damage to the Western world, which is all they want and agree on.
For terror organizations around the world there is one thing that is absolutely crucial, to keep evolving . Few examples are worth to mention: military collaborations cross Sunni/ Shia currents (IRGC and the Palestinians org. Hamas and PIJ), new financial strategies as using Bitcoin which is much harder to follow, gigantic media channels for donations, recruitment, and intimidation, including using Telegram app which is hardly traceable, UAV’s manufacturing, Cyber etc.
In order to strengthen the collaborations on the working levels, this decision of working together had probably one root, a decision agreed upon between the IRGC an the al-Qaeda leaderships.
The IRGC hosted in Iran (and according to some evidence, still is) some members of the al-Qaeda leadership. Although the two are practically enemies, they learn to contribute to each other and to benefit of each other’s.
They both saw opportunities in Bab al-Mandab due to the fact that both have proxies/ allies that are actual experts of this geographical area of the world, so why not to work together to benefit all?! We would mention the slogan of the three musketeers, were it not pathetic.
Both Houthis and al-Shabab ethnical origins are coming from tribes that deal with Piracy. In fact, the area of the Bab al-Mandab straits together with the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, is historically one of the most piracy stricken areas of the world.
To get the “go ahead”, it was agreed (between IRGC and al-Qaeda leaderships) that Yemen will be the prototype. The Houthis will need to strengthen their relations with AQAP, and if it goes well AQAP leadership will close the circle hermetically with al-Shabab’s leadership. Yes, it sounds like a “too bad to be true” to the Western eye, but that’s what happened.
The economical spark, smuggling heaven, where the bad guys are happy:
The Houthis discovered a gold mine in the last two years, ransom, consulting on shipping routes according to the Houthi state of mind, and security escort in the areas mentioned, providing them an estimated monthly revenue of 180 million USD. This is massive. This is a dramatic fact for the IRGC that after all that happened, now needs every penny, more than ever before. Seeing it works well, al-Qaeda and its affiliated al-Shabab wanted in on the scheme.
So far, what we know about the new trend is this: Somali shores are being used for both export and import of weapons, drugs, terror manpower and key figures, even cash. The IRGC understood that the new reality will not allow them to ship easily like before any kind of weapons/UAV’s/rockets to the Houthis directly to Yemen. So, they thought of a method, similar to the chains of smuggling they built along the years to supply, Hezbollah and Hamas for instance, their weapons through third countries.
Destination: Houthis
Weapons, explosives, UAV’s, rocket parts are being loaded on ships heading to East Africa. Then, two options: First, some shipments are arriving in different countries like Sudan or Tanzania using small fishing boats, and little by little, they’re doing their way to Somalian shores into al-Shabab’s hands. From here, some of the shipments will stay in Africa and some will be heading on smaller fishing boats for the Houthis in Yemen. Second, shipping the weapons from Iran to the Houthis, using a third element fishing boat. In East Africa there is a strong presence of professional smugglers , Pirates and fishing communities and this combination works like a charm for the Iranians.
In fact, beside the ballistic rockets that at this point go directly to the Houthis, an increasing volume of the supplies that the IRGC feeds the Houthis, is spread and done by these two ways mentioned above. That way it is possible to keep the shipment safer from the reach of Western elements because it’s easier to catch one targeted ship compared to dozens of fishing boats.
Destination: al-Shabab
Again, two main options: First, a certain part of the shipment of weapons, UAVs and more that was meant to head for Yemen, stays in Africa. Al-Shabab orchestrate that kind of operations on the Somalian side. Second, the opposite way, when they in small fishing boats the weapons are being shipped from the Houthis in Yemen to Somalian shores into al-Shabab’s hands.
Smuggling in both directions, we have several spots passing through the Somalian coastline that are known smuggling hubs : Qandala, Ras Aseir, Khar Khar and Alula (Caluula).
Why it pays off:
This kind of method in which all sides are shipping to all sides is very unique in the terror world. It is giving the leaders the guaranty that some of the shipments will always find their way to their destination, as it is not possible to foil everything. The equation is the same as in the drug trafficking world, you catch one and meanwhile three more go through .
Furthermore, the IRGC and the Houthis did the math, the same AK 47 (Iranian version) can be sold at a much higher price in Africa compared to the Middle East.
The money is split between the relevant terror groups, and the more sophisticated weapons like UAV’s stays at al-Shabab’s hands.
It just gives all sides what they need; weapons, tech, money and power.
“On ISIS and Al-Qaeda, submitted in July 2025 to the Security Council, identified a Somali national named Abdul Razzaq Hassan Yusuf is facilitating the transfer of weapons between the Houthi militias in Yemen and Al-Shabab, the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia.”
The report stated that “Abdul-Razzaq Yusuf collaborates with an arms smuggler based in Yemen named Abu Kamam, when he transports weapons to the Houthis and the Shabab movement”.
Military cooperation:
The intelligence put a spotlight on the military cooperation that increased dramatically between the Houthis and al-Shabab. Today, nearing the end of 2025, we know already of a number between 450-500 al-Shabab’s operatives that went to Yemen to receive a military training on a higher level. This is not only by Houthi instructors, but by QF and Hezbollah as well. This includes tactics, shooting, snipers, UAVs and even cyber. At the same time, we know about several Houthi engineers that appeared in Somalia in order to establish a domestic manufacture of UAVs and UUVs, both IRGC directed.
The way we understand the neighborhood, the man who probably is the key figure in the operational and tactical military cooperation is Abdolreza Shahlai. He is the most important figure of QF in Yemen for years, and a key figure in QF in general. He is one of the main reasons that the Houthis grew to be what they are today. Rumors have it, that he is not in Yemen in the past months and it will not be surprising at all if he had a long visit to/will pop up soon in Somalia.
In the financial aspects an the more sophisticated approach, Sa’id al-Jamal is the main Houthi figure that orchestrates the financial operations through multiple straw companies including in Somalia, and by using Somalian individuals.
Conclusion:
The cooperation between terrorist elements surrounding Bab el-Mandab, both from the eastern Houthi side and from the Somali direction, is increasing, both in the frequency and intensity of operations. Terrorism and criminality are mixing and supporting each other, creating an environment in which the level of threat to international trade is constantly intensifying.
The combination of easy financial gain and achievement of political goals, both at the regional and local levels, together with the extensive experience that these organizations have gained in recent years in the arena, constitute for them a vital resource, which they have no reason to stop but rather to develop.
From the Western side, this infrastructure and activity constitute a challenge that will increasingly require more resources. While the volume of shipping traffic through the Suez Canal has decreased in the last two years, traffic southward along the eastern coast of Africa, near the Horn of Africa, may also be affected.
The solution, in the short term, must be operational, and in the long term, political. Above all, we need immediate intervention and international cooperation in both securing the shipping routes and thwarting the supporting financial mechanism.